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1 
Survey cl Dynamic Ccmputational General Equilibrium Models 
for Tax Pelley Evaluation 
1. Introduction 
There is a well established and fast growing body of literature focusing on tax policy evaluation 
using disaggregated computational general equilibrium (CGE) models. That such models have become 
so popular Is hardly ,u'Prl:ing. In fact, the CGE approacih has several advantages over more macro 
orienled aggregated models or analytical parllal equilibrium analysis. First. ttre CGE methodology 
. / 
allows the study 01 differential impacts acnoss sectors of production and'ocnoss.consumer groups. 
Second. U allows one to consider the' int~ractions among different s.ectors and agents so that the 
policy evaluation is not biased by ceteris paribus assumptions. Third, and in a more technical vein. 
it makes use of flexible computational numerical techniques. Analytical tools often become 
intractable for disaggregated models. Fur1hermore, the CGE modeller does not have to be confined to 
small changes in parameters. This i,. an Important feature. because large changes In policy 
parameters ere often ""nremplaled in most tax reform proposals. 
Historically. the field was fostered by Ihe early pioneering work of Harberger (1959, 1962. 
, 9SG). Herberger uses a highly aggregated analytical model to focus on the taxation of capital 
Income. The first fully dlsaggregated computational general equilibrium model was introduced by 
Shaven.Whalley (1972) to evaluate the effects of differentiallaxalio. of Inceme from capital in the 
u,s.. 
Until the early eighties most empir[cal general eq;uiiibrium work for tax policy evaluation 
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static. tnvestment passively actjusts to saving: The typical instruments in the U.S. tax system are 
. 
modelled and the government budget Is balanced. This state of affairs Is discussed and surveyed In 
Shov';n (1983), Fullerton-Henderson-Shoven (1984}. and Shoven-WhaJ)ey (19S4). t 
I 

Integration, etc - has Induced Important developments. There have been attempts to Incorporate 
life-eyc!e behavior, intergenerational issues. allocation of savings, investment decisions and 
adjustment costs, corporate financial decisions, and government deficits, In to the CGE models. 
,
, 
Underlying all of these features is the need to endow the models with a dynamic structure, w~houl I 
which most of the above issues cannot. be adequately addressed'. ! IThe first efforts to incorporate dynamics into the CGe tax models are associated with • 
Fullerton-Shoven-Whalley (1978, ·1981, 1993). Consumption decisions incorporale some t 
I 
int~rtemporal aspects and an Intertemporal equilibrium path for the economy Is obtained by Ihe 1 I
,sequencing of static short-n.m equilibria. The equHibna are connected through the evolution of the , 
I 
capital endowments which_ tn turn depend on 'saving ·behavior. A compr~1e discussion of a recent I 
i 
Iversion of Ihis model is provided in Ballard·Fulierton-Shoven-Whaney (19SS). I 
More: recently. a whole new generation of models has been developed by Andersson (19S7). ! 
Auerbach-Kotlikoff (1983. 1984. 1987), Ballard (1983), Ballard-Goulder (laeS), Bovenberg I 
(1984, 1985, 19B5), Erlich·Ginsburgh-Heyden (laB7), Fellonstoin (19B4. ISBS). Goulder I 
(19BS). Jorgenson-Yun (1984), Pereira (leaSh. 19B7e, ta87d). and Goulder-Summers 
!(1987). 
tThis article focuse~ on slJch efforts. Our scope is narrow, By concentrating on decentralized i 
I 

i 
Mo~e recently j the ~hrust towards better descrIptive power together with the nature of the tax 
policy issues under analysis . effects of a ponsumption tax. capital taxation. corporate tax 
,. 

3 
numerical W~{ieral equilibrium modelling designed 10 addresS' tax polic" issues. we abstract from 
. several ether related areas and approaches. First. we. abstract from analytle models along the lines 
of Abel-Blanchard (1983). and Judd (1985). Second. we abslract from centralized growth-type 
megels of laxation like Charnley (1981. 1982). T.hird. we abstract from eentrali.e<i models 
I 
! 

associated with World Bank researchers. See. for example, Adelman-Robinson (1978) and 
Dervis-de Mele-Robinson (1981). Finally. we abstract from other CIl!: fields. See. for example. 
Shoven.\Vlcalley (1984) for a sUlVey ollotematlonal trade applications. Decaluw';·Martens 
(1985). ane Robinson (1986) for applications In the area of development. James (1985) for a • I 
I 
survey of economic history applications. and A. Manne (1986). and BOrges (1988) far all I 
encompassing surveys. 
The models included in our comparfsion are: I 
/ 
/ I 
1. 8allard.Fuliertan-Shaven·Whalley (198S) l 
2. Andersson (1987) 
3. Auerbach·Kotlikoff (1963, 1987) 
4. Bailarcl (1983). and Ballard·Gould., (19aS) 
5. Bovenbe,g (1985. 1985) 
6. Erlich·Ginsburgh-Heyden (1987) 
7. FeltenSleln (1984. 1985) 
S. Goulde. (1985) 
9. Goulder·Summers (1987) 
10. Jorgenson. Yun (19B4) 
11. Pereira (1986b. 19870) 
•, 
4 I 
The ke'i features cf these models afe sum.marized in Table 1, which provides a structure for the 
discussion. Most of toe models Ihal we examine could be said to be In the 'Yale tradition', That Is, 
they wer. developped oy s!ud"nts oi Herbert Scarf or students of the students of Herber1 Scar!, This 
.­includes Balla,d·Fu"er.M-Shoven-Whalley, Andersson, Ballard-Goulder, ~,)Venberg, FellenSlein, I 
i• Go-cider, Goulder·S!Jmmers, ar,d Pereira. The exceptions from this heritage are Auerbach­
• !,Kotlikoff,. Erllch-Ginsburgh.Heyden, and Jorgenson·Yun. I 
This .survey is organized <.is follows. :rne second section provides a brief overview of I 
I
'non-dynamic' CGE models, The third seolion offers a discussion of modelling economic behavior and 
equilibrium. The fourth section focuses on model implemenlalion and policy .ev~uatlon. The fifth Isection summarrzes empirical evidence en selected policy issues. The sixth section illustrates the 
! 
power and wea~nesses of dynamic modelling with the issue of corporate lax/integration. Finafly. the !., 
last section summarizes the state~of-the-art in terms of dynamic modelling for lax policy 
evalutlon, and sugg-es:s areas of future research. 
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2, "Brief overview of 'non-dynamic' CGE models 
The origin of most or the models we survey goes back to the work of Scarf (1967, 1973). whl> 
first developed a reliablo algorithm to compute equilibrium price. for a Arrow·Debreu economy, 
HiS algorithm used simp!icial Bubdivision techniques and can -be shown to be the computational analog 
of the fixed point theorems previously used to prove the existence of equilibrium. His technique 
could soW. a model with an arbitrary number of consumers and commodities, as long as all agents 
were price takers. consumers were subject to b'udget constraints, demands were continuous, and· 
production did not display increasing returns to scale, The alQorithm, while guaranteed to converge, 
I 
I 

I 

! 

I 

was relatively slow for prcb1ems involving more than S1I:f, 20 dimensions. A maior improvement in 
computational speed Woo offered by Merrill's algorithm (1972), which used tpe same fundamental 
/ 
idea:> as Scarfs procedure. / 
Scarfs model (as is true for the standard Arrow-Debreu model) does not include a government 
sector ~ neither taxes nor public goocs. At!. one of the mosi promising appHciUions of the new 
computational techniqu. w~s in Iha area of tax policy evaluation, Shoven and Whalley (1973) 
exlended the general equilibrium model and computational approach to include a wide .rr.y of taxes 
and a governl11&nt spending plan, The original Shaven·Whalley model was static (although the 
different commodi~ies CQuid be considered simitar goods available at different datest as In 
Arrow-Debrau), and government was a",umad to run a balanced budget. The data are arranged as a 
social accounling matrix. The model's spacification and calibration is checked by solving it in the 
presence of the base set of laxes. The result should ba exactly tha initial social accounting matrix, 
After having pas."d this replication check, the model is solved for a counterlactua!, equilibrium In 
the presence of a new tux design. The result is once again a social accounting matrix. The two 
equilibria are compared in order to t;.SS(:$S the impact of the new tax plan. The first uses ot this 
• 
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model .for lax policy eva;ua!jon were Shoven.Whalley (1972), Whalley (1.975), and Shoven 
(1916), 
Completely static models as Shaven-Whalley's are unsatisfactory for many tax reform ISsues. 
These include corporate lax Integration, effects of invest.ment tax credits, effects of accelerated 
depreciations. consumer 'Or e)'.penditure tzxes~ importance of saving subsidies like IRA's. etc. These 
are essentia!ly dynamiC ksue:s. ' They involve not only the allocation of capital across sectQfs,'but 
perhaps more Important the capital intensity of the economy,' But, the capital accumulation and 
capital reallocation take time and may involve adjustment costs, Because of these issues. Ballard· 
..Fulierton~Shoven~Whal:o;}y took the first steps towards developing a dynamic model . 
. In this conlexl, the Shoven.Whalley model has been extended and implemented for Ihe U.S. 
-economy In BuIIBrd·Fulienon·Shoven·Whalley (1985). While Ihis book completely documents the 
, , 
mo~el. it was used in several public,alions beginning in 1978. Their mode) consists of nineteem 
production sectors, twelvo households, and fifteen consumer goods. It includes a very detailed set of 
taxes including the federal and state personallncome taxes, federal and state corporate income taxes. 
SOCial Security taxes. pro1J0rty taxes, unemployment Insurance. excise taxes. sales taxes, etc. It 
has been calibl att-d to reproduce the 1973 U.S. economy. Recentty, a version corresponding to the 
1983 .J.S. economy has been developed. 
wThe 8a!lard-Fullenon-Shoven Whalley model is dynamic In the sense that consumers face a 
choice between current consumption and leisure versus future consumption (which can be 

. purchased via s ..wlngs), The consumer classes act as if they were maximizing a nested CES utility 

function over the domain of a CES aggregate of contempo-raneous consumer goods and leisure. and 

future consumption, subject to their income constraint. The parameters of those funcHons 

determine the shares of income devo1ed to each commodity. to saving. and to the 'purchase' of leisure. 

They also determine the two key elasticities in the models ~ the elasticity of labor supply with 

• 
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. respecl to t.>e r••1 aoer lax wage ra!e, .and the elasticity of saving with respecl 10 the real after lax
- . 
rate of retum to capital. 
In the model. consumerS have myopic expectations regarding lulure prices and, in particular, 
regarding the future rale of return 10 capilal. Ballard (1983), and Ballard·Goulder (1985) 
inco~ora1e both' perfect foresight and limited foresight into this model. Future consumption is 
'acquired' by buying a fixed composition portfolio of real investments that offer an infinite annuity 
of returns. 
The production side of Ihe model is compielely static. The mod.1 Incorporates a constant· 
olas!icily 01 substitution betweeen prlmary inputs in production (capital and labor) and fixed I 

coefficients for intermediate inputs. The model distinguIshes between Industrial outputs and 
eonsumer goods for the simple reason Ihat tile data are classified differenUy. Industrial sectol'$ I

/ I
, 
involve such categories as forestry and fisherle., metal min'o9, and publishing and printing, while 
consumers purchas-'3 fUfHi1ure. 2ulomoblles, and books. Th.is fact is recognized in the model by I

• 

incorporatir,g a secord stage Of production, which converts industrial outputs intO' consumer goods. 
This technology is uSt!ally mod9-l!ed as a flxed~coefficient conversion matrix. 
The Ballard·F"I!Nton-Shoven.Whalley model assumeS that the private sector finance. 
marginai ioveslment with the same composition of debt and equity as currently exists in each sector. 
This is the same ar.sumrtion that Herberger originally used. Investors all hold debt and equity in tile 
same proportion. Th&reiore. this ownership can be aggregated into simply capital ownership. For 
tax purposes, however, the separate treatment of debt and equity is taken into account at both the 
corporate and persof',a! Io=vel. SimllarlYJ the dividend poIicies on corporale equitY are established 
exogenously. There are no government bonds in the model, since there are no government deficits. 
The modol is solved for a sequence (as many as 100) of temporary equilibria, wltll consumers 
allocating income between present and future con::;umption at each point in time. The palh for 1he 
14 
economy ~ a sel of connected equilibria. The connectIon is pra~ided by capital accumulation. 
Capital accumulation is endogenous and determined by saving. The model stans with a socia> 
accOunting m,i;1!rix. In the bz,.se case the economy is assum.ed to be in a steaqy state growth -path (along 
which all relative prices ~fe constant). The madel solves for both the naw steady state growth path 
and the transltion 10 it z;f~er a policy intervention. 'rhe 'authors have frequently addressed the 
question-of how"!ong rt t",Kes to effectively settle un10 a new steady S1ate growth path. 
The dynamics of the model are limited. however. in that future consumption is collapsed into a 
composite commodity. A!so, the absence of government deficits and the lack of'productlon dynamics 
limits the realism of the Ballard·Fulierton·Shoven-Whatley model for the analysis of dynamic 
policy issues (such as the adoption 01 a consumption tax or Ihe elimination of the investment tax 
credit). The models we survey try to Improve upon Ihe Ballard-F,lIierton·Shaven-Whalley 
dynamic modelling. The models Jn~orporate more forward lookTng behavior. They improve the 
. " 
dynamics on the con&umrtkm side of the economy, and some of them introduce true !;1ynamlc behavior 
on the part oI the producers, We turn now to the issues inY9lv_ed in developing such dynamic models. 
15 
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~3. ~ssues in the modelling Of dynamic behavior. 
We will 100k fir::.t at the speclficalion of economic behavior of consume(s~ producers, 
goyemment, and Ihe r~sl of Ihe world. The modemog of corporale and household financial decisions I 
is then addr.5sed. Finally. Ihe eencept of equilibrium is discussed. I 
i 

I 
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3.1 Consumers' behavior 
Early efforts 10 build dynamic features into the economic behavior 01 consumers are due to 
Ballard (1963), and Auerbach-Kotllkoff (1983, 1984). Their work has been closely followed by 
several subsequent authors. In faet, dynamic household behavior Is the single most pervasive aspect 
/
/,
amohg the models surveyed. 
All the models Inc-O'1'orale some loro\ of lila-cycle behavior. Household behavior is dewmloed 
by the maximization of an addWV'ely separable. time invariant intertemporal u.tillty function. The 
utility lune1ion is defined oyer the domain of the consumption goods In the economy. In most of the 
models, leisure is also an argument in utility, so that labor supply is optimally determined. 
Utility maximi4ation is subject to a lifetime intertemporal budget constraint which equalizes 
the presen1 value of consumers' income and expenditure. More reeentiy. in Andersson (1987) • 
. Bovenberg (1985). and Pereira (1986b. 1987d), the constraint i$ defined as a sequence 01 
recursive equations of motion on wealth. This has the potential advantage 01 accomodating liquidity 
constraints. However, It should be recognized that in the absence 01 liquidity constraints (i.e. when 
consumers are free to completely borrow against future income), the two specificallons of the 
househofd c.cnstraint are essentia!!y equivatent. Furthermore. tn both versions saving is optimally 
determined as a way of translaring wealth intertemporally. 
1 6 
Some 'l'odels now have a. sophisticated dynamic specification of hoosehokl. In Ballard (1983),
. 	 -
Ballard·Goulder (1985), and Auerbach-Kotlikof! (1983, 1984, '1987), consumer's behavio, is 
embedded in an i"terQE!nera;ional setting. Each of them has S5 age cohorts simulataneously alive. 
Som-e measure of jntergener::;1ional altruism is considered in the form of bequest motives. In Ballard 
(1983) and Ballard-Gould.r (1985), consumers derive utility directly from bequ.thing parl of 
their wealth. Therefore. bequests assume 1he form of a scrap value of terminal wealth of a 
generation. In Auerbach·Kotliko!f (1983, 1984, 1987), each generation empathyz •• with Ihe 
utility of future generations ovar bequeth.d wealth. In addition, Ballard' (1ge3) includes detailed 
demographic p,oiections wfill the intent of incorporating in the policy analysis the effects of the 
• Post World War 	tI baby-boom. 
. In the real world. household decisions also include the optimat allo~"atiOn of saving among 
, 	 ­
alternative physical or financial assets. Theories of household portfolio behavior are relatively 
, 
, I
wen~estab!lshed, However, they involve uncertainty as a crucial element. Accordingly. they have 
·not been incorpora~ed in the context of the determinIstic dynamic models we sutyey here. We will 1 
Come backt-O this Issue below. 
3.2 Producer.' behavior 
The efforts to build dynamic features into the economic behavior of producers are more recel'lt 
and less widely adopted. The first attempts are due to Bov.nberg (1984, 1985) and Summers 
(1965), Dynamic behavior has been more fully incorporated In the recent models of Andersson 
(1987), Auerbach-Kotlikoff (19B7), Goulder·Summers (1987), and Pereira (1986b, 1987d). 
Part of the reason why production side di'namlcs has been more slowty adopted is the weak 
supply of accepted theories referring to the dynamic behavior of the firms. In the models referred 
I ,17 
to above. gynamlc produc!ion and investment b~havior are ·induced by the existence of capital 
adjustment costs and linked to Tobin's q theory. Adjuslment costs are designed to capture both the 
incomplete mobility of capital aoross industries and installation costs ~.e. the costs of adjusting 
capital towards its cpHmai level). 
Adjl,lstment costs can be conceived as internal to the firm and measured in terms of foregone 
outpul along the lines of Lucas (1967). Alternatively, adjustment costs can be viewed as actual 
external cests incurred together with Ihe purchase costs, along the Unes of Gould (1969). With the 
exception of Pereira (198Gb. 1937d). all of the CGE authors follow the former approach. 
The firms in the economy maximize their market value, as the present discountad value of the 
future stream of dividends. In Andersson (1981), and Pereira (198Gb. 1987d), firms are seen as 
maximizing the present discounted value of net cash flow. Maximization is constrained by Ihe 
,/ 
, 
adjustmenl cosl lechnology and ~n equation of motion describing Ihe evolution of the capital stock. 
It should be noted that undere,ogenous divldend/relention rules the two problems are equivalent. II 
, 
should also be nOled Ihat a salisfectory economic rational. for th" ••istoo"" of dMdonds with the 
present tax code is missing in the profession (Shoven (1986)). 
The models with static formulation of producers' behavior are characterized by passive 
investment behavior. Investment merely accomodates to saving in the eccnomy. With a dynamic 
formulation induced b;' adjustment costs, real investmen! decisions are forward looking. Investmenl 
,Is endogenously and optimally determined by the firms. A fundamental difference between the 
shon·run in which capital stock is given, and long·run in which Ihe level of capital is allowed to be 
optimally determined is emphasized. 
This extra richness of produc1ion dynamics is not without costs. A careful look at the summary 
tables will clearly show an inverse relation between the adoptlon of dynamic features in production 
and the level of disagreggation of the production side of the economy. In fact, with production 
• 
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dynamics, $e dimension of the problems is immensly increased. Let !.IS be more specific. 
In a static framework with constant returns to scale production technology. the output level is·, 
indeterminate. The optimal aliocation of inputs can be. obtained by cost minimization, with any 
feasible output level generatillg zero profits. Such zero profit conditions are used to solve for the 
output prices in terms of the: factor prices and hence· to reduce the dlmensionality of the problem 
from the -number of commodities and factors to the number of factors. Thus. even if the model deals 
with 30 production sectors, the computation of an economic equilibrium can take place using only 
the dimensionality of the primary inputs in the economy. 
Now, under' certain regularity conditions on the production and adjustment costs technologies, 
leading to enough concavity of the optimality objective, the intertemporal output path for the firm is 
endogenously, optimally, and uniquely determined even with constant relums to scale technologies 
(see Pereira (1985, 1987a)}. Ac;cordin~!y, with adjustment costs in the model optimal profits 
. . 
will in general be non-zero. This result has crucial implications for the computatiQn of equilibrium 
in the model~ with production dynamics. With adjustment costs, no reduction of dimensionality is 
possible. The curse of dimensionality returns as a binding constraint. 
The introduction of adjustment costs adds another significant complication to the model. With 
capital being less that perfectly mobile in the economy, different rates of return on capital will 
exist in different sectors. This is a difficult problem to tackle conceptually in the absence of 
uncertainty. Also. in the real world, producer maximization choices include also its choice of 
financial ratios (debVequity). and payout rates (dividend/retained earnings). These financial 
subjects are difficult and much Clf this behavior is still taken as exogenous by the modellers. We 
will come back. to these issues below. 
· i 
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3.3 government behavior !
· ! 
Two issues dominate the modelling of government behavIor.. First. govemment behavior has Ibeen typically seen in Ihe CGE liIerature for lax poliCY evaluation as constrained by yearly balanced 
I 
budsets (see, for example, 8allard-Full.rton-S~ov.n-Whafley 098S». The analysis of 

govemment defidlS and public debl in a CelE context requires a dynamic selling. Second, the level of 

government expenditures is either exegenouty given as in Auerbach-KoUikofi (1984. 1987). 

6ovenb.rg (1984. 1985), Feltenstein (1984. 1986). and Jorgenson-Yun (1984). or 

endogenously. (but no! optimally) determined by the balanced budget conditions as in 

6allard-Fullerton-Shoven-Whalley (1985). Andersson (1987). Erllch-Ginshurgh-Heyden 

~ (1987). Gou/der (19aS). and Gou/der-Summers (1987). In the second case, the composition of 

• 

public expenditures is often optimally determined. However. the leve~ of government expendi1ures 
can only 00 endogenously and optimally determined if the government is seen as an optimizing agent 
and is allowed to run deficits. 
'The first attempts. to deal wiU, the government defiCits in CGE tax models are due to 
Auerbach-Kollil<off (1984). and Fe/!ens!ain (1984). In Auerbach-Kotlikof! (1984). government 
expenditures afe exogenous. They grow at the rate of growth of population. However. given 1he tax 
structure and tax revenues, yearly deficits and surpluses are atTowed. subject to an in1ertempond 
. constraint that the present value of future tax revenues equals the present value of future 
expenditures, 
In Fellenstein (1984, 1986), government expenditures are also exogenously given. He also 
allows the government to run deficits to finance expenditures in excess to 1ax revenues. However, 
surpluses are returned to CQnsumars in the form cf transfers. Accordingly. government ts not 
subject to any constraint regarding the future repayment of public debt. 
In GouJder (19851. the 9?Vernmenl maximizes a static 'social welfare ~nctio" subject to a
-
• 
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balanced budget conSir::.;tlL This follows the optimal al!ocatkm of government expenditures alpng 
the lines of Baliard-F"Heiton-Shoven-Whalley (1985). Ttle model Is generallzea to allow for 
exogenous' changes in HIe time path of government expenditures. Two financing alternatives are 
consjdeft~d and contr8s1ed; EldditionaJ tax reven.ues and bond issuance. 
Pereira (198Gb, 1137d). auempts to address both the incorporation of deficits and' the 
determination of govem:::ent ex.penditures. The path of government expenditures and the path of 
delicilSlsurpluses (ano therefore the path lor debt) are endogenously and optimally determined. The 
government is. seen as m<Jximizing ;;:n intertemporal social welfare function given the 13x: structure. 
,Optimization is subject to a sequence of recursive equations of motion reflecting the evolution of the 
pt,lbllc debt, allowing fDr government budget imbalances. It should be stress;:athat this specificatio.n 
,
. " 
01 the government cOMtcalnt is equivalent to the specificaUon in Auerbaeh-Kotlikoff (1983, 1987) 
when no liquidity constraints affect -gove~nment behavior. 
The extra richness in the treatment o.f government behavior allows tfte examination of 
government debt po!ic:es in a truly dynamic setting. Also. financial crowding out effects induced by 
"government deficits can be analyzed (see Auerbach-Kottlikoff (1987), Feltenstein (1986), and 
Pere"r. (198Gb, 1987e)). 
3.4 Foreign sector 
Most of the open economy models follow the assumptions of balanced trade with import and 
export net demands characterized by constant elasticities along the line. of Ballard· 
-Fullerton-Shaven-Whalley (1965). Such is the case of Salfard (1963), Ballard-Goulder 
(19S5), and Goulder-Sllmmers (1987)_ In Feltenst.in (1985), the rest of the world is treated as 
21 

'an addjlion~ consumer group. 
Bovcoberg (1986). develops a model In which two economies lIr. considered. each following 
intertempoml perlect foresight paths. These economies meet in the international forum. Their 
trade rela:roMhips are characterized by yearly balanced trade accounts. 
None of the new generation of dynamic cae tax models has yet IncorPorated the lnternational 
capital flows as done in aoulder-Shoven-Whalley (1983) for the earlier Ballarr:!­
-Fullerton· Shaven-Whalley (1985) model. This is unfortunate as there is an important 
Intert.mporal aspect to international lending. The first al1empts along Ihese lines are due to 
Andersson (1987), and Erlich-Glnsburgh-Heyden (1987). Andersson (1987). in his model of the 
Swedish economy, adopts a closed economy appraoch in which rates of return in the domesJic 
economy are largely determined by the international capital markets. Fi?d'interest rate. induce 
/ 
Int.lnatlonal capital flows, which determine and finance the International lrade imbalance.. In 
lurn, In Erlich.Ginsburgh.Heyden· (1987), foreign trade Is generaled according to an 
intertemporal Irade welfare lunction with constant import and export elasticities. In the short·run 
they allow inlernational trade inbalances which generate capilal ftows to the domestic households. In 
the long run, however. trade balance is assumed. 
3.5 The need for financial markets 
A dynamic economic Wucture not only provides the ideal environment 10 model many features of 
economic behavior. it also permits one to Incorporate the financial side of the economy. If the 
government is allowed to run deficits. the question 01 deficll financing automatically follows. If 
investment is optimally dewmined and returns to capital are different aClOSS sectors. problems of 
investment financing arise. If there are se"eral final'1cfal assets In the economy· government 
4-
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bonds. privpte bonds. and equity (or simply physical capital installed in· different sectors). the 
problem of allocation of saving among assets with potentially different returns arises . 
. The papers surveyed var,. greatly with respect to l~e extent of their attention to the financial 
side" of the economy. At Clne extreme are the models in ~anard·Fulierton·Shoven-Whalley (1985), 
Andersson (1987). Ball<l,d (1983). Ballard-Goulder (1985). Bovenberg (1985. 1986). and 
Erlich-Gjnsburgh-Heyden C19B?}. which are. devoted exclusively to the real side of the economy. 
In turn. Auerbach-KotliKoff (1984. 1987). Feltenstein (1984. 1986). and Goulde, (1985). 
allow for government debt. In these models saving finances changes in governm.ent debt and physical 
capital. Private and publlc 2ssets are perceived by the households as perfect substitutes. The 
allocation of saving merely adjusts to the relative demands for funds. 
Feltenstein (1984, 1986) is the only model surveyed which introduces money. Government
, 
, 
deficits are financed by issuing money and bonds according to an exogenously given rule. Money is 
demanded by consumers for transaction motives and an exogenously given fraction as a store of value. 
On the other hand, government bonds and physical capital are the vehicles for the intertemporal 
transfer of wealth. 
Summers (1985). and GOll!der·Summers (1987) introduce a whole menu of financial assets ­
firm specific equity capital. Different assets earn different rates of retum. However, such rates 
are equal up to constant and exogenous sector speCific risk premia. Therefore. the introduction of 
constant exogenous risk premia, as helpful as it may be in the context of calibration, does not solve 
the main issue of the non-optimality of the allocation of saving. Also, talking about risk premia in a 
deterministic context is somewhat unsatisfactory. 
Pereira (1986b, 1987d). also introduces a whole menu of assets, private and public bonds and 
firm specific equity. However, all the assets are expected to yield the same rate of return. and 
therefore perc~jved as perfect substitutes. The different asset types allow consideration of 
23 
exogenOU$~8t;,Uequjty !triO dividendlrc~enlion rufes and therefore seve-ral sources of investment 
financing: bond,;, equity and retained earnin'gs. 
The non·cptimalHy of the allocation of saving, and the absence or exogenelty of corporate 
financial rules is _a reftectlon of the limitations of the determInistic approach. Either in a context of 
perfect anticipation oi the future prices; Of, in general, within the t$atm of point price 
expectations. all the papers follow a deterministic approach. Under such circumstances. consumers 
either expect diHerent rales of return (inclusive of risk prem.ium) across assets. in which case 
they wilt buy only one asset (that with highest rate). Of they expect equal rat~s of relurn. in which 
case Ihey are indifferent about the asset composition of Iheir portfoliO. There is no way of 
Irading·off rales of return and risks to obtain an optimal interiof solution to the problem of the 
allocation of saving. 
The most advanced contribution in the modelling of saving allocation, in a CGE setting is due to 
, ' 
Slemrod (1980. 198:3), in the context of 'a static one-period model. In his model. consumers act 
according to a two stage separable decision process. They Hrsl decide on how much to save. Then 
they, decide on the allocation of saving according to an Indirect uttlity function dependent on the rates 
of ratum and variances offered by the different assets in the eoonomy. The sourCe of riskiness in the 
&Conor,y comes from an uncertain marginal product of capital. On the other hand, aside from 
portfolio decisions. the res! of the economy is insulated from uncertainty. 
The most complete contribution in terms of the treatment of the corporate financial rules is 
Fulienon·Gordon (1983), In a variant 01 Ihe Bailard·Fulienon-Shoven·Whelley (1985) model. 
Fullerton and Gordon have capital intensity and optimal financial decisions Jointly deter~ined 
through a two siage process. The cosl of financing capital is minimized by trading off the tax 
advantages of debt against the e"pected real bankrupcy coSls inherenl with high debVequity ratios. 
Given the optimal debt/equity ratio. the level of inveSlment Is chosen such that at Ihe margin the 
24 ! 
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rerurn pn ~uity equa!s the return on bonds plus an exogenous risk premium. 
3.6 Market assumptions, equilibrium and expectations 
Virtually all of the papers arc characterized by Walrasian market clearing assumptions. All 
markets are perlect1y competi1ive. Atomistic competition among agents 1s assumed even though· only 
a flnile number of agents is considered, Virtually. no mark~t disequilibria or price stickiness afe 
considered. The only exception is Erlich·Ginsburgh·Heyden (1987) •. In thei' model of the Belgium 
economy I the _wage rate is fixed in the short-run. Therefore, in the shOrlwrun desequilibrium in 
the: labor market will generate endogenous unemployment. However. in lh$ long-run all prices 
Including the wage rata are Ilexible. and, accordingly, ali markets ciear. / 
Given the dynamic nature of be,havlor in the economy. markel·cfearing prices in each period 
depend on expectations of ft.;!ure prices and on tax variables In the economy. There are essentially 
two ways at interpreting the economic equilibrium in such a dynamic conte~•. If future prices are 
perfectly anticipated (i.o. expectations are self-fulfilling). a perfect foresight equilibrium. 
'prevaHs, Then, future actions are merely the implementation of current decisions for future 
periods. However, jf ptica expecla110ns are not perfect (Le. agents make mistakes w1th re$pect 10 
future prices). then a temporary or short*run equilibrium prevails. Markets ciear. and clearing 
prices depend on fu1ure price expectations, Current plans about the future are typically not 
precisely implemented. They will be revised as more or better information becomes available to the 
economic agents. See Grandmant (1982), for a comprehensive survey 01 the temporary equilibrium 
literature. 
Wilh the exception of Gould., (1985), and Pereira (19S6b, 19S7d), all the models surveyed 
adopt th~ concept of a perfect foresight equilibrium. In turn, Baliard·Gould.r (1965), considers a 
J .. 
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flexible am,9unt of foresight In terms of the number of yea"rs over which price movements are ~ 
foreseen. Pereira's model (1986b, 1987b)) is flexible in a somewhat different way in that it can 
indude any range of foresight from myopia to perfect foresight.
. . 
. The choice between the perf.ct foresight and lemporary equilibrium is ultimately to be made on 
philosophic grounds. It can be argued that less than perfect expectations Imply that agents are 
irralional in some way (see Auerbach-Kctiikoff (1987 p. 10). However, the reverse argument can 
be made. One can question. wi':.ether agents are reaHy rationar and perfectly knowledgable about 
future prices. 
Recent evidene. of Bali.rd (1987), Ballard-Goulder (19851, Goulder (19851, and Pereira 
(1986b, 1987d), suggests that the choice in modemng expectations is an important one. They show 
that the degree of foresight inl0 thc future (ranging from perfect foresight to-myopic expectations) 
/ 
may' have dramatic impacts on the pollcy conclusions of Ihe model. Accordingly, the best research 

strategy may b. to design models which are flexible enough 10 allow for different rules regarding the 

. 
formation of expectations. With the exception of the articles just mentioned, sensitivity analysis 
•;have previously not been performed along this dimension. 
In terms of implementation, the two concepts of equilibrium - perfect foresight and temporary 
equilibrium .. have different implications. The dimensionality of the equ1ibrium sol\l1ion algorIthm 
is involved. Suppose we have a model with ten markets to be run for a period of 50 years. Aside 
from normalization, a perfect foresight model implies computing prices In 500 dimensions, while a 
-t~mporary equilibrium model requires sorving SO equilibria. each in ten dimensions. Given that 
computational speed often varies with the cube of the number of dimensions. the lemporary 
equilibrium formulation is potentially strikingly more feasible. However. Ballard (1987), and 
Goulder-Ballard (1985) have devoloped techniques to greatly speed the computation of a perfect 
foresight equilibrium. 
26 
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4. Jrnplemenlalion and Issues on policy evaluallon 
4.1 Calibration and equilibrium comparlslon. 
CGE models at. typically parameterized by the use of a calibration procedure. Some parameters 
are exogenously given. However, some crucial parameters are determined in such a way that the 
model replicates the data for a given base year. See Mansur·WhalleY 11984) for an eXlensive 
discussion of 1~i$ issue. 
CalibratIon in a dynamic context is generaliy interpreted as requiring two properties. First. 
. . 
replication of base year data is required. Second. the model is parameterized to simulate an 
intertemporal balanced growth path when Ihe base policy is maintaineq/ This Is the approach 
followed by Ballard (1983). Ballard·Goulder (1985). Goulder (1985). and Summers·Goulde, 
(1986). It follows the practice of Ballard·Fulierton·Shoven·Whalley (1985) with their 
sequential c.quilibrium dynamics. 
Other authors Auerbach-Kotliko!f (1983. 1984, 1987). Boyenberg (1984, 1985. 1986). 
and Pereira (198Gb, 1987d), follow whal we cali a qualitalive calibration. The slructural 
palametars are exogenously chosen so that lh. economy follows a reasonable path into Ihe fulure. 
ThaI has 10 do wllh the fact thaI given the recursive nature 01 the dynamic economy. and aside !tom 
such structural parameters, only iniUa! stock values are needed to run these models. Given initial 
conditions on the stocks of say, private wealth, capltal. and government debt, agents will optimize 
and Ihereby generate a lirst round of net demands and equilibrium conditions. In lurn, the 
equilibrium prices will determine the evolution of the stock variables into the next perIod. 
There are several potential problems with calibration in the conlext of dynamic models, The 
assumption of a steady·state growth ~ath in the base case can be questioned. First. while 
27 I ! 
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••,
steady·staU! is a possib::ity, it certainly is not the only meaningfull solution to dynamic models. 
Even in the case of a perfect foresight equilibrium, the model implies an equilibrium path which i 
may or may not involve colanced growth. The model, not the modeller, should dictate the nature 01 I 
the·base case path. Second, in the context of a temporarY equilibrium path; a steady state solutlcn is I
nol a likely model Qutc..On1t;l. In fact, unless· expectations are stattc. short run behavior consistent 
with a steady-state evolution will, in general, not be generated. On the other hand. if static I 
expectations are self~fu!fjili[1g. we have in fact a perfect foresight model. Third. even the base year 
replication requirement may cause problems In Ihe cOntexl of temporary equilibrium. Any' 
calibration parameter would be conditional on expectation rules, which is probably an undesirable 
feature. 
The nalur. of the two-requirement calibration strategy is very much'in the spirit of the 
,.. 
• 
traditional design of the comparision of alternative equilibria: comparis_ion between a steady-state 
base case on one hand. and alternative paths including a transition period and a finat sleady¥state on 
the other hand. Pereira (198Gb, 1987d) compare. different (not necessarily steady'state) 
equilibrium paths, The arguments against such a procedure are based on the idea that the impact of 
policy changes can be observed most easily, since all departures from the steady·state can be 
attributed to the altemalive polioy. On the other hand, the base case so dEfined as a steady·state is 
consist~nl with previous work in a 'less dynamtc' setting and Iherefore allows a common standard 
. for comparing model results. 
4.2 Computation algorithms 
We are still al a stage in which basically each author uses a different computational technique. 
Th. development of dynamic models - in parlicular wilh adjustment costs andior perfect foresight. 
• 
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has corresponded with the decline in the use of fixed point algorithms. In -fact. given the relative 
:arge dimensions inevitably involved. such algorithms lend to be very inefficient at the best and 
chen prohibitively stow. See Stone (1985) and Preckel (1965) for a comparative assessment of 
different computation techniques. Among the. models surveyed, only Ball':1rd.Fulle(ton~ 
-Shaven·Whalley (1985). and Feltensteln {1985} use Merrill's variant of the fixed point 
algorithm 1echnique. 
Auerbach·KoHikoff (1963, 1984, 1967), follow a three stage procedure. They first compute a 
base case steady-state, then a revised case steady state, and finally. transition path for the economy 
ber..veen these two steady-states. tn all stages, a Gauss-Seidel iterative procedure is used. 
. Ballard (1982), Ballard-Goulder (1965), Goulder (HiSS), and Summers-Goulder (1986), 
~ 
use a method developed by Ballard and Goutder which is similar in many awects to the Fair·TaylQr 
, 
• (1983) algorl1hm. Short-run equilibria are calculated (using Merrill's algorithm) parametric on 
nrice expeC\~lions. The model is then iterated to generate self-fulfilling intertemporaf expectations 
and the corresponding perfect foresight equilibrium. In a relatively similar approach, Andersson 
!1987} uses a simulation program, SIMNON. developed In the University of Lund. This program 
can handle two-paint boundary problems In a fashion consistent with the multiple shooting 
algcrlthm (see Lipton-Poterba-Sachs-E;ummers (1982)). 
Boyenberg's computational approach (1985, 1985) differs from the other models surveyed in 
that he relies heavily on analytical techniques. Computations are done by using a dynamic version of 
, Johanson's linearization method. Being essentially determined by the continuous time nature of the 
! 

I 

I 

f 

model, thiS linearization model has the disadvantage of confining the analysls to infinltesinal changes 
around the base case equilibrium (see Bovenberg (1985) p. 53). ! 
Pereira (1986b, 1987d) uses an optimization algorithm NPSOL - developped by 
r,Gill,Murray-Saunders-Wrlght (1986)), This algorithm is used 10 compute the sequence of 
I 
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S:hort·run \temporary equilibrium which makes up the intertemporal equilibrium path. The 
equilibrium conditions are seen as nonlinear equality constraints in the minimization of an artlcial 
objective function. The prices are normalized to the unit simplex by an additional linear equality I I. 
1 • constraint. 
II 
Erlich·Ginsburgh-Heyden (1987) follow a unique approach in that they use a variant of the 
optimization technique introduced by Negishl (1960). The economic equilibrium can be generated 	 ,i 
.,as a solution of a mathemallcal program Ihe objective function of which is a weighted sum of the 
utility functions of the various agents, while tho constraints set consists of the market dearing 	 :; , 
1 
, 
conditions. Gin.sburgh-Heyden (1985) have extended Negishi's resulllO tho case of downward price 
lrigidities. I 
Finally. the paper by Jorgonson-Yun (1984) is also unique in tIlat it is the only 
/ I 
econometrically estimated model. Different blocks for the consumption and production Side of the 
- . . \ 
model are separately estimated, to provide the necessary structural parameters. i
, 	 I. The diversity of computation techniques is yet another indicator of the exploratory nature of the 
body of literature surveyed in this article. 
4.3 Equal yield comparisions 
The link between a base case and counteriactual simulations Is usually provided by the concept of 
equal yield. Shaven-Whal!ey (1977) discuss the meaning 01 equal yield in a general equilibrium 
context when government is not allowed to run defICits. Equal yield is interpreted to moan constant 
'public utility'. Government base case utility is maintained in the counferfactual experiments. With 
balanced budgets, the concepl of equal yield is unambiguous. The new equUibrium prices and the 
balanced budge! condition will del ermine the minimal expendilure and taxes needed to maintain base 
! 
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case publi~ utility. Accordingly, in general, equal yield is inconsistent with equal nominal tax 
revenue. Some change in tax revenue Is necessary. Different tax replacement schemes ate 
considered to assure that enough tax revenue is collected. This is the approach essentially followed 
by most 01 the papers surveyed. Only Feltenstein (1985), Goulder (198?). and Jorgenson-Yun 
(1984). chose not to follow an equal yield strategy. 
. The question is of how to Interprete lila concept of equal yield when the government is a!lowed to 
fUn deflcLts. The optimal leve! of expenditure for base ease public trliUty can now be ta:.:Ainanced. 
bond financed .or financed by a mix of bonds and taxation. We have several versions of equal yield. In 
particular. equal yield may now be consistent with equal tax revenUE!. Furthermore, some meaSure
. . 
<;>f financial crowding out effects of government deficns can be inferred from the comparislon of the 
several equal yi.eld alternatives. These issues are extensively discussed ~/Pereira (1987b). 
4.4 Price expectations and the dynamic generalization of, compensation 
Indicators. 
The sum of equivalent and compensation variations over households is the most widely used 
aggregated measure of efficiency gains or losses. In the context of $teady~state eomparisions and/or 
when complete future markets exist andlor perfect foresighl is assumed there are no difficulties 
associated with the use of the standard Hicksian indicators. In fact. correct future prices are known 
in these cases. 
If expectations are not self· fulfilling andlor future markels are not available. a dynamic 
generalization is necessary. 8allard·Goulder (1985) provide some steps in that direction by 
defining an indicator that accomodates periods far into the future when households do not have 
perfect foresight but a steady~state prevails. On 'he other hand. this issue is more fundamental in 
i 
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, 
,the contex~ of a G?ner;:1 lemporary equilibrium ftamawor~. In such Circumstances. Pereira 
(1986a) dev~lops a c,'namlc generalization which is obtained as ,the present discounted value of a i 
i 
sequence of short-fUn optimal expenditure functions consistent with a base case expected future I, 
stream of I,lWities. I 
/ 
/ 
32 

5. .:Empirical evidenee from selected policy Issues 
Dynamic tax models have generated several important results which escaped Sialic modellers. 
The following is a seleC!'£!d set of issuos whIch stress the marginal benefits of dynam~ modelHng of 

. economic behavior in innov<:<.tive areas .of analysis. The discussion of a consumption tax emphasiz.es 

the benefits of dynamic t':::usehold behavior and interge:nerational aspects. The study of the 

f;lliminatlon or the re~intToduction of the invests:nemt tax; credits is made meaningful by the dynamic 

modelling of production betlav;or. Modelling governmenl in a dynamic conlexts allows the modeller 

to study the irrrpact of government deflcits. Finally. a dynamic framework lets us appreCiate the I 
relevance of consumer expectations in terms of the evaluation of policy alternatives i/ 
i/ "5.1 Consumption Tax 
t, 
! 
, 
By Its very nature a consumption tax can not be adequately investigated with a static model. 
• 
Fullerion-Shoven-Wha!icy (1983) use Ihe model of the U.S. economy .s described in 
"Ballard-Fullerton-Shoven-Whalley (1935) to evaluate the movement from the currenl U.S. tax I
sys1em to a progressive consumption tax. Since their modeJ Incorporates a Jabor/leisure choice. 
" 
where leisure is an untaxed commodlty. their results reflect the fact that both the consumption tax 
and Ihe present system are d;slortionary. 
Concentrating on the rntertemporaf distortions, they show that sheltering more saving from lhe 
current U.S. income tax could improve econornic efficiency even if marginal tax rate increases are 
necessary in order to maintain government fevenue~ At first you have a revenue shortfall. 
However, the economy moves to a higher sustatned growth path. and uitimatefy lower tax rates 
cangenerate the same revenue path. Also, wages increase in the long run with this policy. The 
• 
•• 
~ 
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present value of welfare g:::i[lS for a potiey of complete savin9 deduction wilh marginal tate 
adjustments (consumption lax) is simulated to be around $500 billion to $600 billion 01 1973 
dollars . 
. They also investiga1e th.':! !;1ngth of ttme it takes th~ economy to adjust to these policy changes. 
Roughly, they estimate the 'long run' to b. thirty years. although this figure Is very sensitive to the 
specification of the savings elasticity - a crucial parameler in this model. 
5.2 Investment T~x Credit 
Goulder-$ummers (1 S87) address the impact of eliminating the lnvestmenl Tax Cradit (ITC) on 
intersectoral capital formation. and on economic growth, Their model is.Ya1ticularly adequate to 
addies$ this issu~ in that is postulates a forward looking investment m9we with adjustment costs. 
They show that the eliminating the ITC causes a reduction in the rale of investment, Inveslment is 
estimated to fall by about 7% in the short-run and by about 12% in Ihe new long run steady state. 
In lurn, a previous policy anncuncement lowers Ihe overall al1ractiveness of Investment and leads 10 
a downward shift of the Investrr,ent profile, On the other hand. the combined effect of a 'revenue 
neutral' simultaneous. efimir.ar!on of the ITC and reduction of the corporate tax rates is a long run 
reduction ef the capital Sieck by 3,5%. This pattern suggests that a revenue neutral increament in 
. both Ihe corporale tax rates and the inveSlment lax credits would be preferable 10 the formula 
. adopted in Ihe U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
Pereira (1987d), addresses the impact of the ITe from Ihe oland point of Ihe curTenllax syslem 
under the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Given Ihe concern over the potential depressiVe effects upon 
savings and investment of the new tax system in conjunction with deficit reduC1ion mechanisms of 
the Gramm·Rudman type, a pertinent question is. should Ih. lTC be ,e-introduced? In the context 
• 
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of his mod~1 of the U.S. economy, Pereira focuses on the trade-off between the distortion in the 
intersectoral allocation of capital induced by the lTC, the lower tax revenues it generates. and' 
potential financial crowding-out effects on one hand, and the positive effects of lowering the relative 
price of new capital g'oods on the other hand. Preliminary results confirm the qualitative results in 
Goulder-Summers (1987). suggestting a welfare gain of about .2% of the present value of GNP in 
the best scenario of absence of replacement taxes. Furthermore. preliminary results show an 
important time pattern to welfare gains, with the average benefits increasing the further you look 
into the future. This pattern is due to the presence of constraints to intersectoral mobility of capital 
and inertia in the adjustment towards the optimal capital levels as reflected by the presence of 
adjustment costs. 
I 

I 

•Auerbach-Katlikaff (1gB?), in the context of their intergenerational model of the U.S. economy, 
consider the impact on savings, capital formation, and interest rates, of deficit policies and balanced 
budget increases in government consumption. They conclude that deficit finance and government 
consumption can significa-ntly crowd out capital formation and lower the welfare of future 
generations. However, crowding out from deficit finance is a very slow process because it results 
from increased government spending over potentially long horizons. Also, deficit policies may 
s'ubstantially influence the long·run interest rates, while leaving the short-run rates essentially 
unaffected. Finally, and in opposition to the central role adjustment costs seem to play in both 
/ 
5.3 Financial crowding out'.eff~cts of government deficits 
Goulder-Summers' and Pereira's models, Auerbach-Kotlikoff suggest that the time path of interest 
rates induced by a policy of deficit financing seems to be insensitive to the presence of adjustment 
costs. 
• 
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5.4 The role 01 consumer ex.pectatlons 
The expectations analysis has uncovered one of the benefits of dynamic modelling. 
Ballard-Goulder (1985) find that the appeal of adopting a consumption tax depends on the level of 
foresight possessed by the consumers. Furthermore, additional foresight may be welfare worsening. 
This is a second best type of result. This tends 10 occur under .policies that lead to capital deepening 
and declining rate of return to capital over time. To the extent that consumers have more foresight. 
they will be beller equippod to anticipate the fall in the rental price of capital. Consequently, if a 
saving incentive is enacted. people save more with myopia than with perfect foresight. Given the 
exi~tence of taxes on capita! and the discrepancy between the private an~--sccial returns to capital, 
, 
the greater savings with myopia is beller socially. Ballard-Goulder find that the welfare gains 
\ 
from a consumption tax are reduced by about 10% when we move from myopia to farleet foresight. 
Therefore, the attractivenness of adopting a consumption tax seems fairly [obust across these 
foresight specifications. 
I 
• 
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6. Tbe power and weaknesses 01 dynamic modelling: the example 01 corporale 
tax Integrallon 
The Issue of corporate tax integration allows us to sh~w the stre-ngths and weaknesses or the 
dynamic approach. Empirical evidence using CGE techniques indicates that, depending on the precise 
scheme of integration and the 1ax replacement methods, integratiOn may have substantial effects. In 
Ihe work of Fulierton·King·Shoven-Whalley (1980, 1981), total integration was found to yield an 
• 
annual static eHielency gain of $4 to $8 billion in 1973 dollars. Simulated dynamic gains may be as 
large as $695 billion or abcu! 1.4% of the present value of tulUre consumption and leisure in the 
U.S. economy. These gains result primarily from interindustry reallocalions of Investment and an 
improved inter~emporal allocation of consumption, / 
/ 
, 
,Mora recent work emphasizes h,Ow consumers' asset portfolio decisions and firms' finanCial 
decisions affect the efficiency gains from integration. Slemrod (1980), focusing on consumers' 
asset ponfo!io deCisions. finds static efficiency gains which are about twice -as Ia.rge as those 
repOrted iiy Fulierton-King-Shoven.Whalley (1961). FuU.rlon-Gurdon (1983), focus on the 
firms' financial decisions. They roporl efficiency gains of .6% of GNP from the elimination of the 
tax distor1ions favoring deb.t. However, when they eliminate the corporate tax and repiace it with 
increaSed persona! income taxes. addlHonal dls10t1ions are created in the optimal labot~leisure 
decisions. These distortions tend to dominate the analysis, slJ(;h that the overall effects of complete 
integration are very modest. Galp.r-Luck.·Tod.r (1986), address simultaneously consumers' 
asset pOrlfollo decisions and the firms' financial decisions. They also find very modest efficiency 
gains from integralion. 
The above results are important. but may be severely biased. There are severa! aspects of 
economic behavior and modelling crucial for the study of Income tax Integration whiCh have no! been 
i 
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captured in.nny of the above papers. One aspect is the absence of government deficits· a balanced 
budget is assumed. It is true Ihal resource crowding OUI is caplured In these mOdels but financial 
crowding out induced by government spending is nOI. Second, investment is not derived from 
optimtz"tlcn behavior. Investment behavior passively accomodates endogenous saving decisions. As 
a consequence, the differential impacts of policies in the incentives to save and to invest are not 
captured. A!so, full capital mobility across sec:ors is assumed with instantaneous capital 
adjustmenlS towards optimal levels. This assumption rules qut different costs of capital across 
seclors and therefore differentiated reactions to tax policies changes. Finally,.!he modelling of both' 
gov9rnmerlt deficits and of endogenous real and financial investment decisions necessitates the 
~nsideraiion of a dynami<: framework and the introduction of financiaJ assets, govemment bonds and 
iprivate financial assets. A dynamic framework also highlights the efficiency effects of Integration on 
. .r ithe '"ptimal intertemporal decisions. The above models are either sIalic (Slemrod's and 

Galper·ltJcke·Tode(sj or a dynamic sequ~nce of otherwise Slatic model •• 
 I, 
Pereir a (1986b), develops a dynamic applied general equilibrium model • to study the t
• 
efficiency effects of integration on the growth and allocation of investmenl across sectors. Special , 
Iattention is paid to the structural affeelS of resource and financial crowding oul induced by 

gove" mect spending and deficits and to the real and financial Investment reactions across industries 

to both tax integration and flnancial crowding out. His mode! departs from previous work on income 

. lax Integraticn, and for that matler from most 01 the CGIE literalure for tax policy evaluation, in 
several direcllons. It encompasses an endogenous sequential equilibrium struelure founded on 
dynamic behavior with flexible expectations. Government deficits are optlmaUy determined. 
Investment decisions are "'tward looking and the resull of optimizing behavior. Several financial 
assets· public and private· are considered. 
Simulation resulls Indicale that the welfare gains from Integration under large deficits are, at 
32 
best, lJlodest when measured in terms of the GNP. The elimination of the corporate tax and its I 

replacemenl by increased income lax rates, yields long run benefits which are never larger, than 
.2% of the presenl yalue ct tel"r. consumption and leisure onder the previous tax regime, and .1% 
under the current tax regime, However. the short run w~l!are effects of full integration tend 10 be 
very low and in in some scenarios even negative. This is a flew intertemporar pattern of efficiency I
effects which reflects an adj'Jsiment lag in the interindustry investment decisions due to the 
existence of costs of adjustment. On the of her hand, partial integration achieved by excluding I 

dividends from the corporale lax base syslematically yields negalive efficlencyeffeclS. In Ihe long I
nm these can be as high as .3% of present value of the future value of consumption and leisure. This 
is a new second best effect suggesllng Ihat less than complete integration may have perverse I 

efficiency effects. / 
, 
.. The dynamic slructure of PerclrB;'s model snowing for an improved freatment of real investment 
declsions and government deficts. provides a potential setting for a more accurate measure of the 
costs and benefits of inlegration. The simulation resullS suggest lower benefits and an intertempora! I
• 
pattern of growing benefits. 
Simulation results also clearly suggest robust negative effects from partial integration. How 
reliable is this result? If dJvidends were deductible from the corporate lax base (as are interes.t 
payments). the preferenlial Ireatmant of debl over equily would be ellminaled. Corporallons should 
be expecled 10 react by decreasing the optimal deWeqully rallo. However. corporale financial 
gecisions are exogenously set In Pereira's model as in aft o.f the other models surveyed that go. as far 
as dealing with the issue. 
Also, withdrawing dividends from Ihe corporate tax base is a way of eliminating Ihe double 
taxation of dividends at belh Ihe corporate and personnal Income levels. How will the optimal 
aliocellon of household saving accomodate that change in Ihe relalive return to corporale equity? 
, 

,
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However, hOusehold portfolio decisions are exogenouly set in Pereira's model as in all of the other 
models surveye<j go as far as dealing with the issue. 
" IIt is sate to say that the evaluation 01 the benefits 01 partial Integration, as defined above, are 
sev:,:re!y underestima1eO. Meanwhile, the distortionS'oenerated by the increase in the marginal 
'personal tax rates designed to ralse the revenue foregone by the dividend exclusion. are fully 
aCC<lunted for. A good measure of the costs of integration together With a poor evaluation of the 
benefils may very well be the reason why partial integration is Simulated 10 yield neg alive 
eHik:ienc:y gains. 
On a different vein, as most of Ihe model surveyed here, Pereira's is a closed economy model. It 
is legitimate to wonder how the resullS would change If international capital flows were anowed. 
. . 	 IThis almost certainly would affect financial crowding out, since a good d~al of the capital inflows 
, 
could be used to finance public debt. 
For these various reasons, the results should be treated as preliminary. but they strongly I 
suggosl that the dynamic structure provides valuable new insights into the corporate tax integration !, 
!SSU2. 
40 

7. :Concluding remarks I 
I 
I 
i 
What has been acccmplished Ihis far? The success of Ihe CGE research in laelding the challenge 
of dynamic modelling can not be denied. 
I 

i
Great progress in the modelling of household behavior has been achieved. Promising 
developm~nts in the modeUing of production and government behavior have also been accomplished. 
Interesting innovations in the concept of equilibrium and computation techniques were discussed. 
The policy. analysis was greatly enriched by considering transitional effects together with longer 
run steady·state equilibrium paths, generalized equal yield strategies accomodating different 
financial crowding out impacts, and generalized dynamic policy evaluation indicators. 
/
An important set of issues have been addresed by the models surveyed. Traditional issues 
, 
focusing on the effects of capital taxation and consumption taxes have been pursued. In terms of 
. " 
capital taxation, for example, the intertemporal nature of the issue was enhanced by allowing an 
,optimal evolution of capital stock in the economy and forward looking optimal investment decisions . 
. 
In Andersson (1987), Goulder·Summers (1987), and Pereira (1986b, 1987d) this is coupled 
with a improved treatment of several tax provisions like investment tax credits and depreciation 
allowances. In terms of the consumption taxes, developments in the specification of Intertemporal 
household behavior, the introduction of overlapping generations and the modelling of 
intergenerational links via bequest motives, as well as a closer attention to demographic evolution, 
provided a much improved economic setting for the understanding of the several aspects of the 
problem. 
Furthermore, dynamic modelling has permitted the addressing of a set of new issues. Policy 
Issues ranging from dynamic tax policy analysis to the evaluation of exogenous changes in 
government expenditures, to the impact of different methods of financing government expenditure, to 
4 1 
, the importance of tinanciai croHrii!1g out. to 1he relevance of consumorS expectations in tne policy 
results, have been addressed. 
Despile all of the progress and, in part due to such progress, several avenues are wide open for 
much ne.ded additional research. The following seem to be the most Interesting and promising 
areas.· First. the specincation of liquidity constraints to household behavior may help to obtain a 
better understanding of policy che.nges that affect directly the interest rates in the economy. Second, 
major attention needs to be paid to the incorporafion of a roraign sector (with open capital markets). 
Third, some efforts are needed in terms of finding adequate computation techniques. now that 
dynamic modelling ,eally makes the curse of dimensionality worse than eVOr• 
. The. modelling of financial markets is the single most unsatisfactory .speet of the dynamic 
models surveyed here~ The problems associated with provlding a mo~, adequate treatment of 
financial markets and, in general, endogenous and optimal financial deci$ions • both at the corporate 
and at the personal levels· have 10 be addressed. That necessarily requires Introducing uncertainty 
into the models. To b. adequate, this must go well beyond the mere assumption of point expeetalions. 
with the whole array of. modelling. implementalion, and evaluation problems thai generates. 
• 

I 
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